1

EVOLUTION, NOT REVOLUTION

THE U.S. CONSUMPTION TAX: EVOLUTION, NOT
REVOLUTION
Daniel S. Goldberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent discussion in the literature regarding fundamental tax
reform has centered around the abandonment of the income tax in favor of a
consumption tax. Not as well publicized is that there has been significant movement toward a consumption tax already, through evolution. And, the income tax
is likely to move even further in that direction in the coming years.1 This article
focuses on these thoughts and observations and considers their implications for
fundamental tax reform.
In general, the tax base under the income tax is the taxpayer’s “taxable income,” a net income concept. In contrast, the tax base under a consumption tax
is the amount consumed. The income tax is usually justified on the basis that
income is the best measure of ability to pay and therefore represents the fairest
tax base. A consumption tax is also justified on fairness grounds on the argument that consumption is a measure of what the taxpayer is taking out of society, an arguably more appropriate basis to tax than income, which is a measure
of what the taxpayer contributes to society. The consumption tax is also rationalized on economic grounds as creating desirable incentives for saving and investing while also being free of distortion in favor of present consumption against
future consumption.
The article begins in Part II by explaining the difference between an income
tax and a consumption tax and provides the backgrounds of the alternative forms
of consumption tax: (1) consumed income, (2) yield exemption, and (3) point of
sale taxation.
Part III identifies various tax provisions in the income tax law that reflect a
consumption tax, some of which are in the consumed income form and some in
the yield exemption form. Several of the provisions are of only recent vintage in
the current Internal Revenue Code and reflect the surreptitious nature of the
trend from an income tax regime to a consumption tax regime. Part IV considers
the positions of both the advocates of the consumption tax and of the income tax
as a means of explaining the evolution of the current hybrid system. Part V
discusses some implications of the trend and analyzes that phenomenon both
from the perspective of a consumption tax advocate and from the perspective of
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See Press Release, President George W. Bush, “President’s Growth Package” (Jan. 7, 2003);
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Details of the President’s Dividend Exclusion Proposal
(Jan. 21, 2003) [both hereinafter cited as the “Bush Treasury Proposal”]; see also Robert F. Manning
& David F. Windish, A Concise Explanation of the Administration’s Tax Proposals, 98 TAX NOTES
(TA) 902 (Feb. 10, 2003).
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an income tax advocate. Each side may be both happy and unhappy with the
resulting camel.2
II. A CONSUMPTION TAX: THE ALTERNATIVE METHODS
One way to measure personal consumption is to begin with a taxpayer’s
income and then subtract savings or increases in wealth. Income is generally
defined for economic purposes as a taxpayer’s (1) personal consumption during
the year plus (2) increase in wealth during the year.3 As such, the tax base in an
income tax system would generally encompass both of those elements. By subtracting savings from income, the resulting tax base would capture only a
taxpayer’s personal consumption. This model of the consumption tax is sometimes referred to as the “cash flow consumed income tax” or simply the “consumed income tax.” It was originally proposed by William Andrews, a Professor
of Law at the Harvard Law School, in a 1974 law review article.4 That article is
generally regarded as the genesis of serious thinking about the consumption tax
as a replacement for the income tax.
Another way to tax consumption is to tax all income from labor and business,
regardless of whether it is saved or spent, but exclude income earned on investment assets. This model of the consumption tax is referred to as “yield exemption.” Under certain assumptions, this method of achieving a consumption tax is
the economic equivalent of the consumed income version. This equivalence and
its implications are discussed below.
Finally, a third way to tax consumption is to impose a tax on the consumption
expenditures at the point of sale. This model of the consumption tax is referred
to as “point of sale taxation.” A retail sales tax and its cousin, the value added
tax (VAT), use this method.
The first two of these alternatives foresee collection of tax annually based on
income or receipts and therefore appear closely related to the current income tax.
As a result, they are most easily compared with the income tax and are the
easiest forms to transition from the income tax. A point of sale tax also can be
converted to an annually collected tax on business, as explained below.
A. The Consumed Income Tax
Under the consumed income tax, the individual taxpayer includes all items of
income, both from labor and from capital, in his tax base, and then subtracts or
deducts the portion of that income that he saves or invests. The resulting amount
represents the portion of his income that he has not saved, (i.e., that he has
consumed), and is the amount that is subject to tax.5 In that manner, the con-

2

A camel is a horse designed by a committee.
HENRY C. SIMMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938), refining Robert Haig, “The Concept of
Income,” in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (1921).
4
William D. Andrews, A Consumption–Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1113 (1974).
5
Id. at 1149.
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sumed income tax would levy the tax directly on consumption.6 The consumed
income tax is computed and collected at the individual level.7 Thus, for example,
an individual who saves $10,000 from his $100,000 income for the year would
only be taxed on his net of $90,000. Administratively, this type of consumption
tax is problematic since a method must be devised to establish the amount of a
taxpayer’s savings. The likely solution would be to designate qualified accounts
at savings banks, security brokerage houses, and other types of financial institutions to track these savings.8
The counterpart to this process for the business taxpayer permits that taxpayer
to deduct currently from gross income any amounts spent on investment in plant
and equipment during the year (in addition to ordinary operating expenses).
Under the income tax, in general, these expenditures could require capitalization
if they create an asset or benefit extending substantially beyond the year of the
expenditure.9
The analysis of a consumption tax often focuses on the cash flow consumed
income tax because it can be collected, mechanically, in a manner similar to the
current income tax. It therefore is most easily compared and contrasted to the
income tax. Observations regarding the consumption tax gleaned from this comparison will generally be instructive regarding other forms of consumption tax
as well.
B. Yield Exemption: Exclusion from Tax of Investment Earnings
A similar end result—taxing consumption, but not savings—can be achieved
in other ways as well, employing variations of the income tax model. For example, suppose instead of permitting a deduction for a taxpayer’s savings or
investment during the year, the tax law permitted the returns from that investment to be exempt from tax instead. Under certain specific circumstances (involving assumptions that (i) tax rates are uniform over time,10 (ii) the deduction
produces an immediate tax saving determined by that uniform rate, and (iii) the
tax savings from the deduction will yield the same return as the rest of the
investment11), this variation will replicate the effect of allowing the deduction.
To illustrate this point, consider a taxpayer’s investment of $100 in year 1 for
which a deduction would be allowed under the cash flow consumption tax

6
See id. Under Andrews’ formulation, a taxpayer would also include borrowings in his tax base
and deduct repayments.
7
See generally id. at 1120.
8
See generally Paul H. O’Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax
System, 66 TAX NOTES (TA) 1482, 1522 (Mar. 13, 1995) (describing the type of form which would
be used to keep track of savings and investments).
9
I.R.C. § 263; Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a).
10
This assures that the tax saved by virtue of the deduction will be collected at the same rate upon
sale of the asset.
11
This equates a yield exemption investment with an immediately deductible investment of the
same amount. If the equivalence is instead based on the amount of after-tax investment, then the
assumption is not necessary, as illustrated later in the text.
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model. Suppose that the taxpayer’s tax rate is 30% and the item will generate the
cumulative amount of $200 in year 3, which will be withdrawn for consumption
and therefore taxable. As a result, a post-tax investment of $70 (the result of a
pre-tax investment of $100 for which a deduction is allowed) will result in pretax income of $200, which when withdrawn and taxed will amount to post-tax
income of $140 ($200 - $60 (tax)). Under these facts, the taxpayer’s net after-tax
profit is $70 ($140 (post-tax return) - $70 (post-tax investment)) and rate of
profit for the relevant years is 100%.
Similarly, if no deduction is allowed for the investment, but the resulting
income is exempted from tax, as under the yield exemption model, then under
these same assumptions, the taxpayer’s rate of profit will be the same as the
foregoing illustration. Specifically, the $100 nondeductible expenditure represents a post tax investment of $100. In year 3, it generates the cumulative
amount of $200, which is exempt from tax. Under these facts, the taxpayer’s net
after-tax profit is $100 and rate of profit for the relevant years is 100%.
In these two examples, the taxpayer’s rate of profit is the same, namely 100%.
Further, the taxpayer in the first example could duplicate the second taxpayer’s
amount of profit by investing the after-tax contribution amount of $100 instead
of only $70. For example, suppose the taxpayer invested $142.86 before tax and
therefore $100 (142.86 - $42.86 (tax savings)) after tax to generate $285.72
before tax, representing $200 after tax amount (285.72 - $85.72 (tax)), and $100
after-tax profit from the $100 after-tax amount invested. The taxpayer’s rate of
profit remains at 100%, and his after-tax profit amount is $100 ($200-$100).12
The above comparison is illustrated in the following table.
TABLE 1
Comparison of Cash Flow Consumed Income Treatment with
Yield Exemption Treatment
Taxes Due
During
Investment
Contribution
Period

Amount in
Account,
Including
Earnings
at End of
Period

Taxes Due
at End of
Period

Cash Flow Treatment

142.86*

0

285.72

85.72**

200

100

Yield Exemption Treatment

100

0

200

0

200

100

Amount
Remaining
After
After-Tax
Tax
Profit

* Represents $100 after effect of deduction: $142.86 (1-.30) = $100
** $285.72 x 30% = $85.72

12
This equivalence can be demonstrated mathematically as follows: Let C equal the after-tax
C
contribution amount (so that (1-t)
represents the before tax equivalent amount), r equal the rate of
return and t equal the tax rate (assumed to be constant). Then, the equivalence can be demonstrated
in the following way. The yield exemption savings at the end of the period will be represented by
C(1+r). Under the consumed income model, the after-tax savings would be computed as follows:
C
C
After-tax savings = (1-t) (1+r)(1-t); i.e., the before-tax contribution (1-t)
multiplied by one plus the rate
of return (1+r), multiplied by the percentage remaining after a tax of t is imposed on the entire
account upon distribution (1-t). This simplifies to C(1+r) and demonstrates the equivalence.
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The first illustration, under the cash flow model, is the method followed under
the traditional IRA. The second illustration, under the yield exemption model, is
the method followed under the Roth IRA. The above comparison shows them to
be identical in effect. The investment result from the Roth IRA may be preferred
over that of the traditional IRA because the contribution limit for the Roth IRA
(currently $3,000 per year) is computed as an after-tax amount, whereas the
contribution limit of a traditional IRA (also currently $3,000 per year) is computed as a pre-tax amount and is therefore the equivalent of only $2,100 ($3,000
x 70%) of after-tax dollars, assuming a 30% tax rate.13 If there were no contribution limits, however, the two would be mathematically equivalent.14
The above equivalence, demonstrated in the Treasury Department’s words
that “permitting the capital cost of an asset to be expensed has the effect of
exempting the income from ownership of the asset from taxation,”15 is dependent on certain conditions. These include the application of a constant rate of
tax, not progressive and not varying from year to year; the taxpayer’s ability to
use the deduction to offset income currently to generate a current tax savings;
and a constant available yield on investments throughout the relevant period.
The absence of any of these conditions will alter the results, but the basic
principle of equivalence is still important.
Notably, even if the expected yield from investments was 100% over a threeyear period, but was not certain, with an equal chance of the return being 75%
and 125%, a risk averse taxpayer who had decided to invest (without regard to
any tax deduction) a set amount would prefer a current deduction to yield exemption. And, if the return ended up being more or less than 100%, the two
alternative consumption tax alternatives would yield different results. But the
difference derives solely from the fact that in a yield exemption regime, a set
amount represents a larger net investment than that same amount would represent in a cash flow regime, where the invested amount gives rise to a deduction,
effectively reducing the net investment to an amount that is less than the nominal
amount contributed. Thus, the proposition merely reflects the preference of a
risk-averse investor to invest less where the return is uncertain than a risk taker.
The general proposition holds, however, and in principle the immediate deduction and yield exemption are economically equivalent. As a result, a consumption tax could be created using the principle of yield exemption for all investments and savings in lieu of immediate deduction for the investment.

13
There are also other statutory rule differences between the two, e.g., higher income limitations
for qualification and more liberal pay-out requirements under a Roth IRA than a traditional IRA.
14
See Leonard Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between FrontLoaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 689 (2001) (analyzing the relative benefits of
traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs as dependent upon the contribution limits under current law and
expected tax rates at the times of contribution and withdrawal).
15
See 116 CONG. REC. 25,685 (1970) (citing 1970 Treasury Department Study on Tax Depreciation
Policy).
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Of course, from a budget scoring point of view, a yield exemption provision
differs from a cash flow provision in that a cash flow provision reduces tax
collections up front, in the year or years of its direct effect, whereas a yield
exemption provision affects the back end income-producing years of the investment only. As a result, the tax alternatives may be subject to different political
pressures. Moreover, if the investment return ends up being unexpectedly high,
the choice from the government’s view of yield exemption over consumed income would appear to be unfortunate, because of the unexpected loss of potential revenue from the government not being a partner in the investment.16 The
disappointment only occurs with hindsight. The exact opposite reaction would
result from a losing investment in that the government would not be a partner in
the loss, either. The government’s expected loss of revenue, in present value
terms, would be the same under both regimes for comparable provisions based
on after-tax investments. Accordingly, consumed income and yield exemption
should have equivalent long-term effects on the budget.
Pushing the analysis of yield exemption somewhat further, a partial consumption tax effect can be accomplished by imposing a preferential tax rate on the
return from investment or savings. For example, if gain from sale of an asset
were taxed at one-half of the regular tax rate, a hybrid consumption tax—income
tax effect would result. Further, if the tax rate were reduced to zero for sales by
decedents’ estates, which is the effect of section 1014, then the hybrid referred
to above would come closer to the consumption tax side.
C. Consumption Tax at Point of Sale: The Retail Sales Tax and
Value-Added Tax
A third method involves taxing consumption expenditures at the point of sale.
Indeed, when most lay people think about a consumption tax, they think about a
tax levied indirectly on consumption. The principal indirect consumption taxes
are a retail sales tax and a VAT.
A retail sales tax imposes a tax on the purchase of commodities, which could
include labor.17 A general sales tax imposes that tax at a uniform rate.18 In
contrast to a general sales tax, a selective sales tax or excise tax is levied at
different rates (including zero) on different commodities.19
The national sales tax, a consumption tax under consideration to replace the
income tax, is generally described as an ad valorum tax.20 Sales at stages earlier

16
See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, at 128-129 (1977) (which
sees this possibility as a reason to prefer the consumed income approach to the yield exemption
approach for investments other than fixed income securities or savings accounts).
17
See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 441 (5th ed. 1999).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 442 (selective sales tax also referred to as an excise tax, or a differential commodity tax).
20
See id. (an ad valorem tax is calculated based on the percentage of the purchase price); Lawrence
J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, in FRONTIERS
OF TAX REFORM 160, 176 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (describing a tax based on a percentage of
purchase price).
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than the retail level are not subject to the tax.21 This exemption of non-retail
sales avoids the cascading effect of tax imposed at each stage of production22 and
thereby avoids discriminating against non-vertically integrated companies in favor of vertically integrated companies.23 Imposing the tax on the gross amount
of retail sales ensures that all of the component costs of production (e.g., raw
materials, labor, etc.) as well as returns on capital (e.g., interest, rent, and profits) will be in the tax base because they will be reflected in the price of the
product.
A VAT is, in substance, a form of a retail sales tax.24 Its advantages over a
retail sales tax lie in its compliance properties and its built-in protection from
evasion.25 A VAT is collected in stages.26 Each producer pays a tax on the value
added to the product being sold.27 The tax is implemented by means of a tax
imposed at the full rate on the full value of the product when sold at retail.28
Thus, the price of the product to the consumer includes the tax computed by
applying the VAT rate to the tax-exclusive price of the product or service.29
Under a credit-style VAT, the retail seller is permitted a credit against the tax
that must be remitted upon retail sale of the product.30 The credit equals the
VAT that the seller paid for raw materials, which was included in the price paid
by the seller.31 In this manner, the retail seller is required only to remit a net tax
payment equivalent to the VAT rate multiplied by the value that the retail seller
added to the product.32 Thus, a credit-style VAT collects a tax at each stage of
production through ultimate retail sale, but the aggregate amount of tax collected
is no greater than the amount that would be collected as a retail sales tax at the

21
See Malcolm Gillis et al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and Differences Among
Alternative Approaches, 51 TAX L. REV. 725, 731 (1996) (contrasting the retail sales tax, which does
not tax business inputs, with the business transfer tax and the value-added tax methods); Alan
Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales
Tax, and USA Tax Into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281, 1315 (1996) (noting that a feature
of the retail sales tax is to refrain from taxing purchases by businesses for resale).
22
See Schenk, supra note 21, at 1315 (1996) (discussing the effect of cascading); see also Joseph
Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283, 332 (1990) (discussing the impact of
cascading on consumers); JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 209 (MIT Press 1996) (detailing the distorting effect of cascading
on consumers).
23
Schenk, supra note 21 at 1315.
24
See DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION 7 (1996).
25
See generally Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place in the
Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 285 (1987).
26
See Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21st Century: The Role for a Consumption Tax, 2
CHAP. L. REV. 133, 139 (1999).
27
See id.
28
See id. at 139-40.
29
See id.
30
See Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS
OF TAX REFORM 91, 93-94 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) [hereinafter “Metcalf in FRONTIERS”];
Schenk, supra note 26, at 139.
31
Metcalf in FRONTIERS, supra note 30, at 93-94.
32
See Schenk, supra note 26, at 139-40.
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final sale.33 To the extent the ultimate retail seller fails to pay over the VAT
portion of a sale, it will not be entitled to its credit.34 Only the tax on the
retailer’s mark-up will be lost.35
A point of sale VAT can be converted into an annually collected VAT, which
can be employed to tax the business taxpayer annually in a manner similar to the
corporate income tax. The VAT, referred to as a subtraction style VAT, however, is a consumption tax rather than an income tax. A subtraction-style VAT is
collected at each stage of production, but the tax due at each stage is computed
by multiplying the VAT rate by the excess of the gross receipts over deductible
expenditures of the payor.36 The cost of raw materials and capital are deductible
in computing value added.37 In contrast, the cost of labor and returns on capital
are not deductible.38
Facially, a subtraction style VAT resembles the corporate income tax, except
that investments are expensed and no deduction is allowed for labor and interest
costs.39 If wages and interest income were taxed to the respective recipients but
allowed as a deduction at the business tax level, then the remaining distinction
between a subtraction style VAT at the business level and a business income tax
would be the treatment of capital expenditures—deductible under a VAT but
capitalized and depreciated, if appropriate, under a business income tax.
III. CONSUMPTION TAX PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
The current Internal Revenue Code already contains many consumption tax
provisions. As discussed below, it seems likely that more are on the way.
A. The Realization Requirement, Capital Gains, Dividends, and Stepped-up
Basis at Death under Section 1014
Under longstanding principles of the U.S. tax law, gain is not includable in
income until there is an event of realization.40 Mere appreciation in value of
property, without more, does not create income subject to tax. Under a pure
personal income tax system based upon the Haig-Simons definition of economic
income, an increase in wealth would result in taxable income to the taxpayer.
The Federal tax system deviates from that ideal because of the realization requirement.

33

See id.
See Metcalf in FRONTIERS, supra note 30, at 96.
Id.
36
Id. at 94.
37
See generally 3 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, at 5-7 (1984) (the cost of capital is only fully deductible in a consumption style
VAT, not a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Income Type VAT).
38
See id.; see also Metcalf in FRONTIERS, supra note 30, at 92 (value added includes the value of
labor and return to capital, so they would be included in the tax base).
39
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 16, at 7-8; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 22, at 197-99.
40
See I.R.C. §1001(a).
34
35
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If a property owner were never forced to sell property, then the appreciation
of the property would escape taxation. In this connection, some exchanges of
property for other property are treated as nonrecognition transactions in that, in
general, gain on the exchange is not subjected to tax at the time of the exchange
but rather is deferred until the property received in the exchange is sold or
otherwise disposed of in a taxable transaction. The mechanism of this deferral
involves treating the basis in the property exchanged as the basis in the property
received in the exchange. Section 1031 dealing with like-kind exchanges; section 368 dealing with corporate reorganizations, which triggers the nonrecognition provisions of sections 354, 356, 357, and 358; and sections 351 and 751
dealing with incorporations and partnership formations, respectively, fall into
this category. The impact of all of these nonrecognition transactions is to accomplish, with some exceptions, the same result as avoiding an event of realization
and therefore treatment as if the new property were a continuation of the taxpayer’s
investment in the old property.
A system under which no taxpayer ever sold property in a transaction requiring gain recognition would resemble a yield exemption consumption tax model,
particularly if the property did not generate a current flow of taxable income.41
For example, appreciating stock in a company that paid no dividends provides
the owner with yield exemption treatment as long as the stock is not sold or
exchanged in a taxable transaction. Indeed, if the stock is transferred by gift,
exemption from current tax for the appreciation at the time of the gift continues
in the hands of the recipient by means of the carryover basis accorded the stock42
in that a lifetime gift is not an event of realization for the donor.43
When a system described above, involving potentially endless deferral, is
coupled with a provision like section 1014, which allows a basis increase to the
value of the property at the date of the owner’s death (which is not an event of
realization for the decedent),44 the system becomes one of complete yield exemption as long as the property is retained until death. Thus, those taxpayers
who acquire property that appreciates in value and hold that property until death,
or give it to a recipient who holds the property until his death, attain full yield
exemption treatment, the functional equivalent of consumption tax treatment.
Does the combination of non-realization and section 1014 basis step-up at
death represent an exception or the norm? For wealthy people, the combination
certainly represents an area of affirmative tax planning.45 It is for that reason that

41
Andrews, supra note 4, at 1128-29 (Professor Andrews pointed out that this fundamental deviation from a pure accretion income tax made the income tax something of a hybrid consumption tax).
42
I.R.C. §§ 1015(a), 1041(b) (in the case of a gift to a spouse).
43
I.R.C. § 1001(c). See BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS ¶ 40.3 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter BITTKER & LOKKEN].
44
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43.
45
Of course, taxpayers who desire to shift portfolio investments may realize gains, but they have a
choice and in many cases can offset those gains with losses they realize for that purpose.
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tax-free reorganizations46 of closely held corporate businesses are attractive tax
planning techniques, particularly for elderly taxpayers. But even for investment
portfolio stock, tax planners advise against sales by elderly taxpayers unless
there are overwhelming investment reasons for the sales. In any event, the amount
of foregone income tax revenue resulting from these rules is extremely large.47
Taxpayers who hold property for a number of years while it appreciates and
sell it before death are accorded only partial yield exemption treatment. The
longer the property is held and the lower the capital gain tax rate applicable to
the taxpayer at the time of sale, the greater the resemblance of the treatment to
full yield exemption and therefore consumption tax. For example, less wealthy
taxpayers who use portfolio stocks as a substitute for or interchangeably with
savings accounts for future consumption do not enjoy the full benefits of yield
exemption, although they may enjoy substantial benefit from deferral and the
capital gains rate preference.
If the capital gains tax were to be eliminated entirely, then yield exemption
consumption tax treatment would be attained without the need for the taxpayer
to die to get it. In that event taxpayers who either needed or desired to sell their
appreciated property could enjoy the same beneficial treatment as wealthy taxpayers. Perhaps as a step in that direction, the individual long-term capital gain
tax rate for most long-term capital gains was reduced recently from 20% to 15%
(from ten percent to five percent for lower bracket taxpayers) upon the enactment on May 23, 2003, of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003 (the “2003 Jobs and Growth Act”).48
46
See section 368, which triggers section 354 or section 356, and thereby treats the taxpayer’s new
investment as a continuation of the old, avoiding immediate taxation of any gain (apart from boot)
until the taxpayer engages in a sale or other realization transaction with the new property.
47
Forgone revenue resulting from special tax provisions that deviate from a reference baseline
income tax are referred to as “tax expenditures” and are catalogued annually in what has become
known as the Tax Expenditure Budget. Tax expenditures are defined in the law as “revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of liability.” 2003 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES at
95 [hereinafter “Tax Expenditure Budget 2003”]. In 1974, the Congress of the United States mandated as part of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that the annual Federal budget presentation
include a list of these tax expenditures. Id.
Foregone revenue from unrealized capital gains is not regarded as a tax expenditure, technically,
because it is not a deviation from the reference tax baseline, even though it is a departure from a
comprehensive income tax. Id. at 112. The tax cost of the realization requirement, therefore, is not
estimated by the Treasury. The tax expenditures attributable to the capital gains tax rate preference
and stepped-up basis at death under section 1014, however, are included in the tax expenditure
budget. Tax expenditures in 2003 attributable to the capital gains rate preference and section 1014
are as follows:

Estimates of total income tax expenditures (In millions of dollars)
Capital gains
Step-up basis for capital gains at death under section 1014

2003
60,200
28,710

Id. at 99. The Tax Expenditure Budget projects that the capital gains tax expenditure will fall in the
future but the step-up basis tax expenditure will rise. Id.
48
I.R.C § 1(h)(1)(B), (C). The 28% rate applicable to collectables and the 25% rate on unrecaptured
section 1250 gain for high bracket taxpayers were retained. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D), (E).
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The discussion above assumed no current payment of dividends. Until recently, the current income tax treated dividends as taxable income, taxable at the
same rates as other ordinary income. The 2003 Jobs and Growth Act, however,
reduced the tax rate applicable to dividends to that applicable to long-term
capital gains, i.e., 15% (five percent for low bracket taxpayers).49 As such, the
income tax still results in a deviation from yield exemption treatment for stock
even if not sold until death, but that deviation has been reduced. The previous
income tax treatment of dividends may explain why almost all closely held C
corporations and so many publicly traded companies have been averse to paying
dividends. If distributions to shareholders were desired, public companies would
prefer to redeem stock so that shareholders could limit their income inclusion to
gain instead of the entire payment, because of the available basis offset, and
could benefit from preferential capital gains treatment of that gain.
The Bush Treasury proposed legislation to exclude dividends from income
completely, but that proposal was modified in the legislation, as discussed above,
to merely a preferential rate equivalent to the capital gains rate. A complete
exemption from income of dividends would be a straightforward yield exemption provision, and represent additional movement toward a consumption tax at
the individual level. Arguably, it represents a correction from the double tax of
corporate income, and there is some truth to that. But the corporate tax, replete
with investment incentives, may also be characterized as a hybrid income/consumption business tax. If this proposal is enacted in the future, then yield exemption consumption tax treatment could be approached, because current returns on stock would be excluded and deferral and preferential capital gain
treatment upon sale would result in partial yield exemption.
B. Retirement Plans
Retirement plans represent the largest statutory inroad of a consumption tax
feature into the income tax regime.50 Corporate defined contribution retirement
plans including those that permit employees to indirectly fund their own accounts by voluntarily reducing their wages to provide a source for employer
funding, referred to generally as section 401(k) plans,51 Keogh Plans for self
employed52 and Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRA”s), both traditional53 and

49

I.R.C. § 1(h)(3)(A)-(B), (h)(11).
Tax expenditures in 2003 attributable to retirement plans are as follows:

50

Estimates of total income tax expenditures (In millions of dollars)
Employer plans
401(k) plans
Individual retirement accounts
Keogh plans

2003
53,080
59,510
18,660
6,770

Tax Expenditure Budget 2003, supra note 47, at 100-01. These numbers are projected to increase in
the future. Id.
51
I.R.C. § 401(k).
52
I.R.C. § 401(c).
53
I.R.C. § 408.
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Roth,54 are the principal types of retirement plans. Section 401(k) plans, Keogh
plans and traditional IRAs provide tax deferral. They permit deductions or exclusions for amounts contributed to the plan by or for the benefit of the taxpayer
and tax-free build-up of interest, dividends or appreciation as long as the funds
remain in the plan, but they require income inclusion when funds are withdrawn.
In this sense, the plans operate in the same manner as a cash flow consumed
income consumption tax would, but are limited to amounts contributed to the
designated retirement accounts. In addition, amounts that may be contributed to
the plans and therefore deferred as income are subject to annual limitations. The
highest of these limitations is $40,000 (as adjusted for cost of living increases)
for Keogh Plans and defined contribution corporate-sponsored plans with employer contributions.55 Employee elective contributions to section 401(k) plans
are limited to $12,000 in 2003, increasing to $15,000 per year when the changes
under the 2001 Act are fully phased in for 2006 (subject to the overall $40,000
contribution limit mentioned above)56 and traditional IRAs currently have even
lower contribution limits of $3,000 increasing to $5,000 in 2008.57
The aggregate amounts involved in retirement plans are by anyone’s measure
quite large. The table below sets forth the growth in 401(k) plans from 1984 to
1993 in terms of number of plans and participants, and the amounts contributed,
retained and distributed by the plans.
TABLE 2
401(k) Plan Trends, 1984-199358
Year

Number
of Plans
(thousands)

1984
1985

Participants
(millions)

Contributions
($billions)

Plan Assets
($billions)

Distributions
($billions)

17.3

7.5

29.9

10.3

16.3

91.8

10.6

24.3

143.9

16.4

1986

37.4

1987

45.1

11.6

29.2

182.8

22.1

13.1

33.2

215.5

22.2

1988
1989

68.1

15.2

39.4

277.0

25.2

83.3

17.3

46.1

367.0

30.9

1990

97.6

19.5

49.0

384.9

32.0

1991

111.4

19.1

51.5

440.3

32.7

1992

139.7

22.4

64.3

553.0

43.2

1993

154.5

23.1

69.3

616.3

44.2

54

I.R.C. § 408A.
I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A).
56
I.R.C. § 402(g)(1)(A)-(B). An additional “catch up” amount is allowed for taxpayers over the
age of 50 in the amount of $2,000 for 2003, increasing to $5,000 in 2006. I.R.C. §§ 402(g)(1)(C),
414(v)(2)(B)(i).
57
Section 219 provides limits on contributions, currently at $3,000 but scheduled to increase to
$5,000 in 2008, with an additional amount for taxpayers over 50 years of age of $500 through 2005,
and $1,000 thereafter. I.R.C. §§ 219(b)(1)(A), 5(A)-(B)(ii).
58
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE ROOTS OF BROADENED STOCK OWNERSHIP, at 9 tbl. 2 (Apr. 2000),
at http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/stock/stock.htm.
55
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As of November, 2002, it is estimated that there were 432,403 section 401(k)
plans, involving 47,210,000 participants, with estimated total assets in these
plans of $1.81 trillion.59
Retirement plans differ from a consumption tax, however, in their treatment
of distributions from the plan. Distributions are taxable to the recipient when
received, whether or not consumed. Moreover, retirement plans (other than Roth
IRAs) require that distributions begin no later than when the beneficiary attains
the age of 701/260 and continue during the periods following commencement of
distributions based upon an actuarial measure of the beneficiary’s remaining life
(and the life of the surviving spouse, if elected). Further, even upon the death of
the plan beneficiary, the amount in the plan (other than a Roth IRA) will be
subject to tax upon distribution as income in respect of a decedent, although
with significant additional deferral, particularly for a surviving spouse, who can
roll this amount over into her own IRA.61 Nevertheless, because of the rules
requiring distributions, retirement plans approach but do not quite reach the cash
flow consumed income consumption tax model.
Both contribution limitations and distribution requirements are being reviewed
by the Treasury, and it is likely that allowable contribution amounts will be
expanded and distribution requirements will be eased in future years in order to
encourage savings and not force dissaving. During the past few years, in fact,
the contribution limits have increased for all types of plans.
Roth IRAs contain their consumption tax feature by means of exemption of
the earnings from taxation rather than by an allowance of a deduction or exemption for the contribution itself. As long as funds remain in the plan, earnings on
those funds will enjoy permanent exemption from tax. The future earnings on
funds once distributed are no longer free of tax. In contrast to the traditional
IRA, however, the Roth IRA, as currently in effect, does not provide for mandatory distributions during the owner’s lifetime.62 As such, the Roth IRA represents a means of accumulating wealth to be transmitted at death. Further, beginning in 2006, section 401(k) plan participants will be able to choose the Roth
yield exemption regime for these plans rather than contribution deduction or
exemption.63
Curiously, both traditional and Roth IRAs permit penalty-free distributions
for various specified purposes other than death, disability or attaining age 591/2,

59
Employee Benefit Research Institute, History of 401(k) Plans: An Update, (Nov. 2003), at http://
www.ebri.org/facts/1102fact.htm.
60
This provision is under examination by the Treasury and its elimination or liberalization may be
the subject of future legislative change, although at this point the form of the liberalization appears
to be the creation of new kinds of savings vehicles, a Lifetime Savings Account or a Retirement
Savings Account, in addition to traditional or Roth IRAs available to taxpayers.
61
I.R.C. § 402(c)(9).
62
I.R.C. § 408A(c)(5); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43, at ¶ 62.4.1. Roth IRAs are subject to
the same distribution rules as traditional IRAs after the owner’s death. Reg. § 1.408A-6, Q-8A14(b).
63
I.R.C. § 402A. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2000).
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referred to as a “qualified special purpose distribution.”64 These include traditional IRA distributions for certain medical expenses;65 those made during periods of the owner’s unemployment, subject to requirements and limitations;66
those made for an owner’s “qualified higher education expenses;67 and “qualified first-time homebuyer distributions.”68
Roth IRA penalty free distributions are more limited, but include distributions
up to $10,000 lifetime maximum used to purchase a principal residence by or for
a first-time homebuyer who is the owner of the IRA, her spouse, a child, grandchild or ancestor of the owner or spouse.69
These flexible distribution rules, which allow distributions for reasons other
than retirement, belie the original purpose of creation of the accounts as individual retirement accounts. This flexibility, which post-dates the original enactment of the traditional IRA legislation, evidences the more general consumption
tax nature of the arrangements.
If one were to posit the simplifying assumption that retired people spend all of
the amounts that they saved previously in their lives, because for example, they
purchase an annuity with the balance in their retirement accounts for their lives
(including spouses), or a distribution schedule can be selected to reflect their
consumption pattern, then the equivalence to a consumption tax pattern is complete, at least with regard to retirement plans. Thus, if legislation under the
income tax would better permit taking distributions only when consumption was
desired, a consumption tax pattern would be approached.
But what about savings outside of retirement plans? These savings are not
treated preferentially. But unrestricted savings of most wage earners (apart from
their homes) pale in comparison to the savings built into retirement plans and
anticipated future social security benefits.70
64

I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2)(A), (B).
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B).
66
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D).
67
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E).
68
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(F).
69
I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(8), 408A(d)(5).
70
See Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (Jan. 2003), which analyzes patterns of growth in net
income and wealth and their distributions across segments of society based upon income, wealth,
and various other characteristics. The analysis and discussion are based upon the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a triennial survey sponsored by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System in cooperation with the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. The most recent SFC indicates that Retirement Accounts are a category of financial
assets consisting of IRAs, Keogh accounts, and certain employer-sponsored accounts, which include
401(k), 403(b), and thrift savings accounts from current or past jobs from which loans or withdrawals can be made and accounts from past jobs from which the family expects to receive the account
balance in the future. Id. at 11. Notably, this category of assets does not include defined-benefit type
retirement plans, the income provided by which is typically based upon worker’s salaries and years
of work with an employer, group of employers or a union. Id. at 11-14. Measurement of the value of
defined benefit plans is made difficult by uncertainties in work decisions, inflation rates, discount
rates, mortality, etc. Id. (Less important for purposes of this point, the category of Retirement
Accounts also does not include any measure of expected Federal Social Security benefits.) Nevertheless, even with the omission(s), 52.2% of all families had retirement accounts in 2001, up from
48.9% in 1998, with a mean value of $29,000, up from $26,100 in 1998. Id. at 12-13.
65
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The Bush Treasury Proposal would have both simplified and expanded individual retirement arrangements by replacing traditional, Roth, and nondeductible
IRAs with Retirement Savings Accounts (“RSAs”) and would have permitted
other kinds of tax advantaged savings through Lifetime Savings Accounts
(LSAs).71
The proposal, in general, would have permitted a taxpayer to contribute up to
$7,500 per year to each type of account.72 Both are yield exemption accounts, so
that after-tax money is contributed (no deduction is allowed for the contribution), but the amount earned in the accounts would not be subject to tax and
could be withdrawn tax-free. The LSAs, for which there would be no income
limitations, would allow withdrawals freely regardless of the age of the owner or
the use of the distributions and there would be no minimum distribution requirement during the owner’s life. The RSAs, as proposed, would require for withdrawal that the taxpayer be at least 58 years old, disabled or deceased.73 Importantly, both yield exemption provisions would be likely to soak up a taxpayer’s
available money, leaving little other money that would earn a currently taxable
yield. The LSAs, in particular, could have this effect because the $7,500 limit on
contributions applies per account holder,74 so that an individual can make separate contributions in that amount to accounts for other individuals.75 Neither the
retirement nor the savings proposals were enacted in the 2003 Jobs and Growth
Act, but may very well be proposed again in the future.
C. Section 529 Education Plans
Section 529 authorizes states to create “qualified tuition programs” under
which income from funds invested in the program is exempt from federal income tax as it accumulates and, further, is exempt from federal income tax if it

Arthur B. Kennickell & Annika E. Sunden, Pensions, Social Security, and the Distribution of
Wealth, Finance and Economics Discussion Series (1997-55), Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Oct. 1997), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/papers/pensionk_s.pdf,
attempt to calculate net worth that includes the annuity value of defined benefit plans as well as Net
Social Security Wealth, the latter of which is not directly relevant to the discussion in the text. Their
analysis is based upon the SFC for 1989 and 1992. They adjust the retirement account data in the
SFC to include for purposes of computing Pension Wealth the present value of employer provided
defined benefit plans, and also compute Net Social Security Wealth, consisting of the present value
of expected Social Security benefits. Pension Wealth, i.e., the adjusted retirement benefit values,
overall exceeded other wealth of respondents, not including the principal residence and business
assets, and represented a proportionately greater portion of respondent’s financial wealth (excluding
principal residence and business assets) for the lower 89.9% of households by wealth than the
households between the 90 and 99 percentiles and to an even greater extent than households in the
top one percent in wealth, for whom retirement accounts were much less important relative to other
non-residence, non-business assets. See id. at tbl. 4.
71
Bush Treasury Proposal, supra note 1. See Manning & Windish, supra note 1, at 918-19.
72
Bush Treasury Proposal, supra note 1. The Lifetime Savings Account, however, permits additional contributions to accounts to be owned by other individuals.
73
Id.
74
The aggregate of all contributions to all accounts in a given name could not exceed $7,500. Id.
75
Id.
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is distributed and used to pay for qualified higher education expenses of the
beneficiary.76 These expenses include tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for enrollment at an eligible educational institution.
Section 529 Plans, as they are sometimes called, allow the creator a great deal
of flexibility to choose when to make distributions, to change beneficiaries, and
generally to use the funds at her own discretion as long as they are segregated
into designated accounts and remain there until paid for the tuition expense of
the designated beneficiary, who may but need not be some member of the
creator’s family.77 In addition, the designation can be shifted from the original
designated beneficiary to a member of the designated beneficiary’s extended
family (up to first cousins, but as a practical matter more likely to be siblings,
children or grandchildren).78
No federal income tax deduction is allowed for contributions to the plan
(although some states allow a minimal deduction for state income tax purposes),79 but the earnings on the invested funds, if ultimately used for qualified
higher educational expenses, are completely exempt from tax.80 As such, these
plans represent a yield exemption form of consumption tax feature, like a Roth
IRA.81
Amounts in section 529 Plans can accumulate for a beneficiary up to the
amount necessary to provide for the qualified higher education expenses of the
beneficiary.82 The plans themselves must provide safeguards to ensure compliance and can therefore limit contributions.83 The benefits, of course, are greatest
the longer the funds remain in the plan. As a result, any parent saving for a
young child’s or grandchild’s education and willing to dedicate amounts for that
purpose would be well advised to create and fund a qualified tuition program.
Even the short-term benefits for older children could be significant if interest
rates were sufficiently high or stock market gains could be anticipated. That is
not to suggest that any parent should dump all of her funds into such a plan.
However, their availability and flexibility make these plans the favored means of

76

I.R.C. § 529(e)(3). See generally, BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43, at ¶ 16.8A (suppl.).
I.R.C. § 529(a), (b), (e)(i).
78
I.R.C. §§ 152(a), 529(e)(2).
79
See, e.g., Maryland, which allows the donor a state income tax deduction up to $2,500 per
beneficiary. MD. CODE ANN., TAX – GEN. §10-208 (2002).
80
I.R.C. § 529(c)(1).
81
Because section 529 plans are yield exemption provisions, they would make up a small portion
of the current tax expenditure budget if they were listed separately, which they are not. For reference
purposes, state prepaid tuition plans, a close relative of section 529 plans, account for only $340
million of tax expenditures in 2003. One would expect that tax expenditures attributable to section
529 plans would increase dramatically in the future, because plans will likely increase in number and
assets within plans will likely grow as a result of further contributions and compounding of earnings.
82
I.R.C. § 529(b)(6).
83
The Maryland plan, for example, limits contributions in the plan to a maximum account balance
of $175,000 per student. Earnings may cause the account balance to exceed that amount, but no
future contributions will be permitted unless the allowed maximum is increased by the plan. MARYLAND COLLEGE INVESTMENT PLAN DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 4 (2001).
77
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providing educational benefits for children that would otherwise be funded without the tax benefits.
D. Home Ownership
The income tax benefits associated with home ownership are (1) non-taxability of imputed income from the use of the home—a benefit similar to the periodic return on the investment in the home,84 (2) excludability from income of all
or most of the gain on the sale of the home (for most taxpayers),85 and (3)
deductibility of home mortgage interest, subject to statutory limits,86 and real
property taxes.87 The first two of these benefits accorded a home would accomplish a yield exemption model of a consumption tax for a home purchased with
after-tax money. But the present tax treatment of a home is even better than pure
consumption tax treatment, because the interest expense from the home mortgage, fairly regarded as either part of the cost of the home, or an expense of
earning tax exempt income, is allowed as a deduction.
If the treatment of the home followed the consumed income model, then the
home would be regarded as a rental property rented to the owner herself. Under
that treatment, the purchase price net of borrowed funds would be deductible as
the net investment in the home and the interest charges for the mortgage would
be deductible as a rental activity expense.88 On the other hand, imputed income
from the use of the house and any proceeds from sale, if not reinvested, would
be included in the tax base.
Under the yield exemption consumption tax model, in contrast, the cost of the
investment would not be deductible, but the yield on the investment would not
be includible. The imputed income, net of mortgage interest, plus unrealized
appreciation represents the net return on invested equity, which should be exempt from tax in this model. The current income tax does even more than that. It
exempts the entire imputed rental income and appreciation (for most homeowners)
and has the further effect of exempting otherwise taxable earnings that are used
to pay interest on the mortgage, the effect of allowing a deduction for the
interest. Thus, the current tax treatment of a home reflects a yield exemption
consumption tax regime, to the extent that gains are within the statutory exclusion limits. But even analyzed under a consumption tax regime, home ownership
enjoys special status, because it benefits from the tax incentive provision allowing for the deduction of home mortgage interest, within the statutory deduction
limits of section 163(h), as well as the favorable tax deduction treatment of real

84

BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43, at ¶ 5.3.3.
Section 121, which contains qualification requirements, limits the scope, in general, to a home
used by the taxpayer as her principal residence for two of the five years prior to the sale and limits
the benefit to $250,000 of excludible gain for a single individual and $500,000 of excludible gain for
a married couple. I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b).
86
I.R.C. §163(h).
87
I.R.C. §164(a)(1).
88
I.R.C. §162. The passive activity loss rules under section 469, which depart from a pure HaigSimons income determination, are ignored for purposes of this explanation.
85
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estate taxes on the home.
The amount of forgone revenue attributable to home ownership as measured
in the tax expenditure budget is huge.89 Moreover, more than two-thirds of families own their primary residence.90
E. Business Tax Incentives
As discussed earlier, the distinguishing feature between an income tax and a
consumption tax at the business level in the form of an annually collected
subtraction-style VAT (and therefore its economically equivalent point of sale
counterparts, the retail sales tax and credit-style VAT)91 is the complete deductibility of business expenditures without the capitalization requirement, and the
nondeductibility of labor and interest costs. However, if wages and interest
income are includible in the recipients’ income and thereby subjected to tax,
which they are under the income tax, then the remaining distinguishing feature
is the deductibility of business expenditures, free of the capitalization requirement. In contrast, an income tax requires capitalization of long-term expenditures coupled with depreciation where appropriate.
Business tax incentives in the current income tax take the form of either an
immediate deduction of the cost of an item that would generally have to be
capitalized, as under section 179,92 extra or accelerated depreciation,93 or a tax
credit for all or a portion of the expenditure.94 Of late, immediate expensing or
accelerated deductions have been the elixirs of choice.95 For example, section
89

Tax Expenditures for 2003 attributable to home ownership are as follows:
Estimates of total income tax expenditures (In millions of dollars)
Deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes
Deductibility of State and local property tax on owner-occupied homes
Capital gains exclusion on home sales

2003
66,110
23,580
20,260

Tax Expenditure Budget 2003, supra note 47, at 99. Imputed income of the rental value of owner
occupied housing is not regarded as a tax expenditure, technically, because it is not a deviation from
the reference tax baseline, even though it is a departure from a pure comprehensive income tax. Id. at
112.
90
See Recent Changes in Family Finances: Evidence from 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, in 89 FED. RES. BULL. 16, 17 n.19, 19t.8B (Jan. 2003). According to the 2001 SCF, for all
but the 90-100 percentile in wealth, the home represents more than half of the mean non-business,
non-financial wealth of SCF respondents. Id.
91
See supra Part II.C.
92
I.R.C. § 179 (relating to tangible personal property purchased for a trade or business).
93
I.R.C. § 168 (statutory accelerated depreciation, generally); I.R.C. § 168(k) (amended by the
2003 Jobs and Growth Act) (bonus depreciation of 50% of the cost of the eligible property allowed
in the year of acquisition, which expires in 2006).
94
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 38, 41, 42, 47.
95
Tax expenditures for 2003 attributed to business tax incentives are as follows:
Estimates of total income tax expenditures (In millions of dollars)
Accelerated depreciation of buildings other than rental housing
Accelerated depreciation of machinery and equipment
Expensing of certain small investments
Exclusion of reimbursed employee parking expenses
Exclusion of employer-provided transit passes

2003
4,240
36,480
1,420
2,190
360

Tax Expenditure Budget (2003), supra note 47, at 99-100.
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179 allows immediate expensing for tangible personal property, like equipment,
used by the taxpayer in his trade or business, up to $100,000 (reduced to $25,000
in 2006 and thereafter) acquired in a taxable year for businesses that purchase no
more than $400,000 (reduced to $200,000 in 2006 and thereafter) of qualifying
property during the year, above which the $100,000 is reduced.96 In addition,
section 174 allows an immediate deduction for research and experimental expenses incurred in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business, which would
otherwise have to be capitalized.
MACRS depreciation allows depreciation deductions on equipment more
quickly than the rate at which the item is likely to get used up economically.
New bonus depreciation, as it is called, accelerates the depreciation into the first
year of 50% of the purchase price (adjusted basis) of “qualified property” as it is
defined in the section,97 with the remaining adjusted basis depreciable under the
older statutory method.
Tax credit incentives allow tax credits for a portion of the expenditures that
the government desires to encourage. Tax credits include business tax credits98
as well as energy tax credits,99 research and development tax credits100 and
others. Absent from this list is the investment tax credit (ITC), originally enacted
in 1962 as a tax credit of seven percent of the cost of depreciable personal
property, i.e., equipment, purchased or constructed by the taxpayer for use in the
taxpayer’s trade or business, later increased to ten percent and ultimately repealed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.101 The ITC, however, is re-proposed
perennially as a stimulus to business investment.
A tax credit is a more precise and easily understood subsidy in the income tax
regime that is not dependent on the recipient’s tax rate. As such, it is sometimes
viewed as a separate class of business tax incentive. However, it can be readily
converted to its deduction equivalent for any particular taxpayer by reference to
the tax rate applicable to that taxpayer. It can therefore be equated with an
immediate deduction for a portion of the purchase price, particularly if the basis
of the property is reduced by the amount of the credit, as it was when the ITC
was first enacted in 1962, or 50% of the amount of the credit, as it was generally
in the last iteration of the ITC before its repeal.102
Each new business tax incentive in the form of immediate expensing, faster
write-off or tax credit brings the income tax closer to the subtraction method

96
I.R.C. § 179(b) (as amended by the 2003 Jobs and Growth Act). The scope of qualifying
property was also expanded temporarily until 2006 to include off-the-shelf computer software.
97
I.R.C. § 168(k)(2) (enacted under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, (hereinafter “2001 Act”) (amended by the 2003 Jobs and
Growth Act, adding I.R.C. § 168(k)(4)).
98
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 47, 48.
99
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 48.
100
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41.
101
I.R.C. § 38 (repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat.
2085.(1986)).
102
I.R.C. § 50(c).
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VAT form of consumption tax model described earlier for business entities. As
discussed above, the Bush Treasury is seeking to expand the scope of business
tax incentives.
F. Observation
It appears that the current Federal income tax really is a hybrid system,
containing several important consumption tax features and trending even more
in that direction with every enactment of and proposal for additional savings
incentives. To the extent that the current system can be characterized as a hybrid
consumption tax, certain income tax features could be viewed as penalties on
some behavior or disincentives. For example, one might view the current income tax system as something close to a consumption tax in which some savings (those outside of retirement accounts or section 529 plans) are penalized.
Taxable interest and dividends from bonds and stock owned in non-tax advantaged
accounts, for example, represent the principal area of disadvantaged savings.
That is particularly true of stocks, because dividends yield no corporate tax
deduction to the paying corporation, unlike interest on bonds, which is deductible. In contrast, savings that are in tax-advantaged retirement accounts,103 newly
enacted education accounts,104 medical saving accounts105 and even home ownership can all be interpreted as elements of a disguised consumption tax system.
Given that, it would be a mistake to view the provisions enacted under the
2003 Jobs and Growth Act, or the Bush Treasury proposals, as radical departures from an income tax model currently in effect, because it would be incorrect
to view the current system as exclusively an income tax. Arguably, the recently
enacted provisions and the Bush Treasury proposal could be viewed as eliminating penalty provisions in an essentially consumption tax system. At the very
least, the current tax system is an income tax-consumption tax hybrid, with the
trend toward the consumption tax side in an evolutionary process.
IV. INCOME TAX VS. CONSUMPTION TAX: THE POSITIONS
The present hybrid system of taxation appears to be the result of a desire to
adhere to the basic tenets of an income tax system to achieve the fairness that
has been ascribed historically to the income tax, but to build in various incentives in the form of consumption tax system elements to correct the likely
adverse economic effects of a pure income tax system. The corrections have
created the hybrid system. The conflict between the basic system and its modifications can best be understood by reviewing the on-going debate between income tax advocates and consumption tax advocates.
The standard and most basic argument in favor of an income tax is fairness.
The income tax in its purest form treats all income alike, regardless of whether it
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derives from services, capital or otherwise. The Code, at least in academic
theory, although deviating from this basic principle as discussed above, is seen
as striving towards this ideal, as exemplified by the use of the Haig-Simons
definition of income as the standard by academics106 and the tax expenditure
budget107 by policy makers. In contrast, a consumption tax is viewed by income
tax proponents as favoring capital over labor.108
Consumption tax advocates, on the other hand, see the income tax as creating
disincentives toward work and saving and investment.109 A consumption tax,
they contend, would eliminate these disincentives. On the surface, it would
appear that taxing the fruits of labor would cause someone to favor leisure over
labor, and taxing savings or the future earnings on amounts saved would cause
one to save less in favor of current consumption. Consumption tax proponents
believe that a shift to a consumption tax system will result in greater individual
savings and investment, capital formation, and ultimately greater economic productivity. Such a shift will lighten the tax burden on capital by allowing a
deduction for investment in the case of a cash flow system, or by exempting
from tax the return from investment in the case of a yield exemption system, or
by excluding investment expenditures from tax imposition, in the case of a point
of sale tax system. As a result, it would follow that a shift to a consumption tax
will reallocate the burden of taxation from capital to labor, because capital will
be more lightly taxed than it is under the income tax. Arguably, labor will enjoy
greater wages, because it will become more productive as a result of the additional capital formation resulting from the shift, and advocates contend that the
increased return to labor will more than make up for the greater proportion of
the tax burden borne by labor.110
The same analysis should apply to particular consumption tax provisions within
a hybrid system, even if the system in its entirety cannot be classified as a
complete cash flow, yield exemption or point of sale consumption tax. Thus,
when any consumption tax provision is evaluated, the battleground will be economic efficiency (stimulus to growth in the economy) versus fairness (overallocation of burden to labor). A close analysis of the economic theory and
empirical evidence of these claims, however, should cause one to be at least
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MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Rev. 4th ed. 2002);
WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 7-8 (13th ed. 2003).
107
Tax Expenditure Budget 2003, supra note 47, at 112.
108
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer than an Income Tax, 89 YALE L. J. 1081
(1980); Alvin Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88
HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
109
See, e.g., Bill Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS IN TAX REFORM, supra
note 20; Bill Archer, Tax Reform and the Consumption Tax, NationalIssues.com (2002), at http://
www.nationalissues.com/taxes/sales_tax/reform_and_consumption.html; Robert E. Hall & Alvin
Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple, Progressive Consumption Tax” in FRONTIERS IN TAX REFORM,
supra note 20, at 44-48; Bruce Bartlett, Consumption Junction, NRO: NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
(April 8, 2002), at www.Nationalreview.com/nrof_bartlett/bartlett040802.asp.
110
See Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS IN TAX REFORM, supra note 20.
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somewhat circumspect about these predictions of consumption tax proponents,
even if on balance they appear likely to be correct.111
Effect on Labor Supply. As indicated above, an important behavioral disincentive claimed by consumption tax advocates involves the effect of the taxation of
income on the labor supply.112 An income tax exempts leisure from taxation and
therefore causes a substitution of leisure for other commodities. On the other
hand, an income tax also reduces the wealth of the taxpayer and therefore may
cause the taxpayer to work more hours to compensate for the reduced wealth.
Moreover, its effect will likely vary among taxpayers depending upon their
wealth, level of income, desire for leisure, need for savings, and non-pecuniary
rewards from work.113 Further, a progressive income tax magnifies this effect for
the highest income taxpayers, because it effectively decreases the after-tax cost
of leisure as wage rates increase. Accordingly, theory alone cannot predict whether
the income tax depresses or increases the supply of labor.114 Rather, one can only
determine empirically the effect of the tax on the work/leisure trade-off,115 and
even then, one is unlikely to be able to conclude much about its effect on labor
without specifying the type of labor, level of compensation for that labor, and
the supplier of that labor (e.g., male or female, old or young, married or single).116
Effect on Saving. The effect of the income tax on saving is of even greater
current interest in the tax policy debate than the effect of the income tax on the
supply of labor,117 and the resulting effect on investment and capital formation,

111
The analysis that follows regarding the effects of the income tax on labor supply and savings is
more fully set forth in Daniel S. Goldberg, E-Tax: Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition to a
Currency-Free Economy, 20 VA. TAX. REV. 3, 20-25 (2000).
112
JOEL SLEMROD & JOHN BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER
TAX REFORM 104 (1996).
113
See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 382-85; Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Morelan, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 52 n.5 (1999) (discussing the
income and substitution effects).
114
See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 376-79. See also Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu,
Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 58-59
(1998) (exploring the economic theory underlying the effect of tax rates on the labor supply and its
manifestation in the income and substitution effects); Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 12 n.50 (1995)
(offering an example of the operation of the substitution and income effects on consumption); Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive
Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1920 (1987) (discussing the substitution and income effects on
taxation).
115
See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 379-80 (summarizing some empirical findings); see also Robert
Triest, Fundamental Tax Reform and Labor Supply, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 247, 256 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
116
See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 380-82. For higher income taxpayers, it is entirely possible that an
increase in the marginal tax rate will reduce the amount of labor supplied sufficiently to reduce the
overall tax collection from that taxpayer. See id. at 383-85. This has been referred to as the Laffer
Curve. See ALFRED L. MALABRE, JR., LOST PROPHETS 181-82 (1994); see also Joel B. Slemrod, On the
High-Income Laffer Curve, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 177, 203 (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 1994). According to SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 22, at 124-25, all but the “most ardent
supply-siders” believe that labor supply responds significantly to tax cuts; see also ROSEN, supra
note 17, at 384-85.
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For a general discussion, see ROSEN, supra note 17, at 385-94.
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which is necessary for increases in future productivity.118 The income tax imposed on the earnings of savings effectively taxes those savings a second time.119
That consequence would cause income taxation to depress savings because the
taxation of interest income should cause a substitution of current consumption
for future consumption.120 This phenomenon is an example of the substitution
effect.121 The bias towards present consumption has the effect of reducing future
accumulations.122
However, the taxation of interest income also reduces a taxpayer’s future
wealth and may cause the taxpayer to save more in order to offset that reduction
in future wealth.123 This phenomenon is an example of the income effect.124 The
substitution effect and the income effect may work in the same direction, thereby
reducing savings, or they may work in opposite directions, creating offsetting
effects with an uncertain net result.125 Moreover, since the effect of interest rates
on the magnitude of savings is itself a subject of controversy,126 it follows that
the effect of taxation of that interest income is also controversial. The effect of
taxation on savings cannot be predicted with certainty without empirical work
and it is not at all clear that any empirical work can be definitive, either, because
of the multitude of changing variables.127
118
See ANDREW ABEL & BEN BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 119 (3d ed. 1998). See also Thomas
Michael Federico, Recent Congressional Consumption Tax Proposals: A Theoretical Inquiry into
their Effects on the Declining U.S. Saving Rate, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 357 (1996)
(savings are adversely affected under the income tax because they are taxed twice); M. Scotland
Morris, Reframing the Flat Tax Debate: Three Not-So-Easy Steps for Evaluating Radical Tax Reform Proposals, 48 FLA. L. REV. 159, 172 (1996) (noting that an income tax taxes both consumption
and savings, while a consumption tax does not tax savings).
119
See Federico, supra note 118, at 357; See, e.g., Archer, Tax Reform and the Consumption Tax,
NationalIssues.com (2002), supra note 109.
120
See Federico, supra note 118, at 357; see also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 22, at 168-70, 389
(where tax reduces the rate of interest received, the opportunity cost for consuming a dollar in the
present becomes more appealing than consuming that same dollar, plus the reduced interest, in the
future).
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See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 22, at 104.
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See id. at 109.
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See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 390.
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See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform on Saving, in
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 83, 96 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds.,
1996).
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Compare DAVID BRADFORD, TAXATION WEALTH AND SAVING, 157-67 (2000), who believes that a
shift in taxes from capital income to labor income will not necessarily cause an increase in aggregate
accumulation of wealth, and Jane G. Gravelle, Do Individual Retirement Accounts Increase Savings? 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 133-48 (Spring 1991), who believes savings incentives
such as IRAs simply induce shifts in savings to tax favored vehicles and in fact could reduce
national savings by causing increased deficits, with Jason G. Cummins et al., A Reconsideration of
Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
A CTIVITY 2:1994, 11-59, American Enterprise Institute Website at http://aei.org/doclib/
20030213_rahass94b.pdf, who have concluded that tax reforms favoring capital can have a positive
effect on business investment, and R. Glenn Hubbard & Jonathan S. Skinner, Assessing the Effectiveness of Tax Incentives, American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (1996), who conclude
that targeted savings tax incentives generate substantial net capital accumulation per dollar of foregone revenue, at least in the short run, and Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, IRAs and Saving in a
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As discussed earlier,128 under the current income tax system, the double taxation of savings is not complete, because some returns on savings, such as capital
gains and dividends, are not taxed until realized or received, and are taxed at
preferential rates.129 This observation does not affect the analysis above regarding the effects of an income tax but rather recognizes, as this article points out,
that the current system is a hybrid.
The crucial philosophical disagreement between income tax and consumption
tax advocates, however, would exist even if the replacement of the income tax
with a consumption tax would create a positive incentive for, and on balance
induce, more work and saving. Income tax advocates argue that any economic
efficiency of a consumption tax should not be exalted over the burden-sharing
equity of an income tax. Income, in their view, is the fairest basis for taxation,
and a consumption tax would unfairly favor those who earn income from capital
over those who earn income from services.130 Further, a consumption tax would
fail to account for accumulated wealth as a source of power, which itself represents economic well-being.131 The likely comparison may very well be (1) the
consumption tax’s correction for disincentives toward work and savings, a byproduct of the income tax, with (2) a distribution of wealth that is not satisfactory to the society at large and thereby causes instability and ultimately adversely affects production.
The above debate has been going on at least since the time of John Stuart
Mill132 and will undoubtedly proceed long after the publication of this paper.
Perhaps it is the inability to reach a definitive conclusion that explains the
current hybrid state of the federal income tax.
V. REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION TO THE CURRENT
HYBRID SYSTEM
A. The Hybrid System in General
If one were to design a consumption tax with components, as opposed to
adopting one of the three primary models, one could treat individual items in
Stochastic Life-Cycle Model, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, Mimeo (1993), and Eric M.
Engen et al., Do Savings Incentives Work?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1:1994, 85151, who find the same phenomenon on a long-term basis, studying IRA and 401(k) programs.
Hubbard and Skinner, in their American Enterprise Institute pamphlet, survey several other studies
on the effectiveness of savings incentives and find diverse and inconsistent empirical results, demonstrating a diversity of views and “proofs” on this important subject. An important practical point in
this debate is that Hubbard, who believes in the efficacy of incentives to increase savings, was the
chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors at the time of the most recent Bush
Treasury Proposal and a driving force behind the Proposal. He is reported to be a strong proponent
of a consumption tax.
128
See Part III.A., supra.
129
I.R.C. § 1(h) (maximum capital gain rate and dividends). See I.R.C. § 1222(11) (net capital
gain defined).
130
See Alvin Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88
HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
131
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132
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accordance with one of the three alternative consumption tax methods. For
example, one could employ a value added tax for businesses and a cash flow
consumed income or yield exemption method for individuals. Indeed, that was
the approach taken in the USA (Unlimited Savings Account) Tax proposed by
Senators Nunn and Domenici several years ago.133
Even more eclectically, one could vary the approach among individual items.
For example, ownership of corporate stock could be treated under a yield exemption approach, excluding from income dividends and capital gains on sale,
but allowing no deduction for purchase price. At the same time, ownership of
real estate or other business assets could be treated under a cash flow method,
allowing a deduction for its purchase price. Such an approach makes it more
difficult to understand any unifying theory of the tax, but may be more feasible
politically, easier to administer or more amenable to transition. For example,
adopting yield exemption for current stockholders would be a welcome improvement; whereas adopting a cash flow approach to stock may be viewed as a
day late and a dollar short by the stockholder who had paid for his shares
previously with after-tax dollars. Change is much easier to accomplish politically by bestowing benefits on everybody, both current stock owners and future
stock owners, as under a yield exemption enactment, than on only some people
(i.e., new purchasers), as under a cash flow model. But even under the cash flow
model, it is possible to construct transition rules that would allow a stock seller
to offset sales proceeds by historical basis in determining gain, but deduct completely the reinvestment of the sales proceeds. And, in all cases, owners should
expect the value of their holdings to be greater than it would have been absent
the legislative tax change, resulting from the tax favored position that would be
accorded stocks, although the market may not exhibit an immediate upward
movement because of a myriad of other unrelated factors.
The current tax system represents, at least in theory, a system grounded in the
income tax but replete with tax incentives in the form of special deductions,
yield exemptions and special rates, to encourage expenditures and savings deemed
worthy by Congress. In effect, these incentive provisions, each an element of a
consumption tax when evaluated separately, hybridize the current system. As
such, it has become difficult to characterize the current system as an income tax
because, for many high income people, it functions much more like a consumption tax system. And, for low income taxpayers, who do not save significant
amounts, there is not much difference between an income tax and a consumption
tax.
For example, for a high bracket taxpayer whose wealth consists largely of
assets in tax deferred retirement plans (corporate pension plans, Keogh plans,
IRAs, 401(k)s), a personal residence and, to a lesser extent, investment assets
the sale of which would give rise to long-term capital gain (or be subject to step
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See Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons, in FRONTAX REFORM, supra note 20, at 54, for an excellent explanation of the proposal.
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up under section 1014 in the event of the death of the taxpayer), it is essentially
earnings from personal services (and some interest and dividends) that would be
subject to tax. Most of the taxpayer’s capital is subject, in effect, to a consumption tax regime.
Recent tax legislation has shown a marked trend to shift the system even
further toward a consumption base. Education savings accounts, and the other
special provisions discussed earlier in this paper, all aimed at high income
taxpayers, who have discretionary income and savings, clearly demonstrate this
trend. Yet, we still refer to our system as an income tax.
Finally, current tax proposals for complete dividend exclusion and preferred
savings accounts may take us the rest of the way to a consumption tax at the
individual level. If enacted, they could complete the evolution.
B. Critique of the Hybrid System
The above observations lead to the question of what is wrong with a hybrid
system? Is it not advisable to combine an income tax with some consumption
tax provisions designed to provide incentives for savings and in some cases
spending in certain designated areas? Do we not get the best of both worlds of
the income tax and the consumption tax, namely a tax system that accomplishes
desirable economic and social purposes? Is any need served by slavishly following an academic’s desire to have a pristine income tax or consumption tax?
1. Limitation of Tax Expenditure Analysis
Individual tax reform provisions that are enacted to encourage savings and
investment are generally evaluated by tax policy analysts as tax expenditures
and the costs of such provisions (lost revenue) are separately set forth in the
Treasury’s tax expenditure budget. The basic premise of this view rests on the
current tax system being an income tax and income for these purposes being
defined, consistent with the generally accepted Haig-Simons definition, as personal consumption plus increase in wealth (excepting imputed income and unrealized appreciation).
Tax expenditure analysis converts special tax provisions and tax incentive
provisions, whether in the form of exclusions, deductions or credits, into their
economically equivalent spending provisions. In that manner, those provisions
can be analyzed and evaluated more clearly than if buried in the tax code. The
process requires one to distinguish between structural provisions, which are
inherent parts of an income tax and therefore acceptable on tax expenditure
grounds, and special provisions, which should be analyzed as hidden expenditures built into the tax system and therefore should be presumptively suspect.
For a provision presumptively suspect, one should require a compelling justification for inclusion of a tax expenditure in the tax system rather than as a
separate budgetary item of expenditure.
Some critics of tax expenditure analysis acknowledge the usefulness of converting a tax rule into its fundamentally equivalent spending program in order to
evaluate whether the assumed spending goal of the tax rule is important or
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trivial and to evaluate whether the costs of achieving the goal are commensurate
with its benefits.134 They argue, however, that to perform the conversion one
need not first determine whether the tax rule qualifies as a tax expenditure.
Rather, any attempt to categorize all rules in the tax law as either structural or
special will inevitably devolve into an argument about whether a particular
provision allowing an exclusion, deduction or credit is structural or special, and
will deflect the attention of policy makers from the issue of whether the rule,
structural or special, is a good rule.135
Other commentators view the conversion of a tax rule into an equivalent
spending program as superfluous or irrelevant, because in order to accomplish a
full accounting of these special tax rules in a tax expenditure budget, one must
first construct an ideal or correct income tax structure. Only departures from
such an ideal structure would be reflected as tax expenditures in the tax expenditure budget.136 Presumably, the ideal income tax would be based on the HaigSimons definition of income. However, it is hard to distinguish deviations from
such a definition, regarded as back-door spending, from provisions that are
regarded as structural. For example, a rate structure deviating from a flat rate
could easily be viewed as a series of cross subsidies, if the base system were a
uniform rate income tax.137 If the tax expenditure budget were designed to bring
to the attention of the public any change in the tax law designed to encourage or
discourage particular activity, a lowering of the rate structure designed to encourage increase in economic activity would constitute a tax expenditure.
Finally, other critics object to the language of the tax expenditure advocates
as denoting a tone of “moral absolutism.”138 Such a position belies the real
circumstance that there is no correct or normative rule of federal income taxation.139 Rather, the income tax should reflect the values of the public for which it
is created. An exclusion for damages received for personal physical injuries, a
denial of a deduction for illegal bribes or kickbacks and an exclusion for imputed income from services all reflect public value judgments, even though they
may depart from the strict Haig-Simons ideal of an income tax.140 Such a pristine
system can only create “an illusion of value-free scientific precision in a heavily
politicized domain.”141
Yet, taking all of these critical views of tax expenditure analysis to their
logical (some might say extreme) conclusion, leads one to the position that the
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appropriate income tax for the society which is subject to it is the one that exists
in any point in time, because that is the one that the duly elected legislature has
selected. Under that position, no particular provision has any greater claim to
legitimacy than any other provision as long as Congress has elected to include it
in the current version of the tax code. Perhaps it is the ascendancy of this view
in recent times that has resulted in the situation that a significant share of the
benefits and subsidies now available to different segments of the public come
from tax breaks.142
Tax expenditure analysis recognizes that taxes are used both to redistribute
income and to influence behavior such as consumption, work, saving and investing.143 Indeed, it has been observed that in some years the amount of expenditures through the tax code approximates between one-quarter and one-third of
the entire expenditure budget.144 Important public initiatives such as subsidized
housing, welfare, health, and energy cannot be understood without looking at the
tax code.145 The tax expenditure budget allows the Treasury to keep track of this
kind of spending and bring it to the public’s attention. Given the number and
amount of hidden expenditures in the tax code, it may be the only way to
rationally account for this governmental intervention in the economic lives of its
citizens, and, notwithstanding its imperfections and imprecision, the tax expenditure budget may very well be the best way to do it.146 Moreover, this can be
done without making a value judgment as to any particular special provision.
On the other hand, if one acknowledges that the system is not an income tax
system but rather is a hybrid system, combining both income tax and consumption tax features, each being regarded as standard or structural in the system,
then the battleground of the foregoing disagreement shifts. All special provisions that we now regard as tax expenditures that stimulate business activities
such as the cash flow model provisions of the deduction for contributions to
retirement accounts, fast depreciation and an exception from the requirement of
capitalization, as well as yield exemption provisions that exempt earnings from
current tax, would not be viewed as tax expenditures because they are structural
in at least some form of consumption tax. Admittedly, some provisions could
still be viewed through the tax expenditure lens, such as those that distinguish
between profit-seeking expenditures regardless of timing, and personal consumption (e.g., charitable contributions, deductions for medical expenses and
the like). Yet, under an acknowledged hybrid system, many of the tax expenditures contained in the tax expenditure budget would be eliminated and much of
the accountability under the current form of the tax expenditure budget would be
lost.
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Without a theoretical standard based upon fundamental principles of taxation
uniformly applied, the system will be cast loose from its moorings. No provisions would have a stronger claim based on principle than any other provision
motivated by a specific identified perceived benefit. Under such a system, future
tax legislation will become simply a test of political power. Predictability and
its stabilizing influence will be lost. As a result, efficiency will be sacrificed.
2. Tax Simplification
One of the virtues attributed to a consumption tax is simplification. An important element of simplification involves record keeping for basis and the tax
administrator’s ability to confirm the taxpayer’s records and assertions. Under a
cash flow system, basis is an irrelevant concept, because all investments give
rise to full deductions and all investment returns that are not reinvested are fully
taxed. As a result, the concept of a basis in an investment asset becomes meaningless because it is essentially zero for all investments.
Under the yield exemption version of a consumption tax, basis is also irrelevant. That is because any return of the investment would not be subject to tax
regardless of whether it represents yield on the investment, which would be
exempted from tax, or return of principal, which would be exempt from tax even
under the income tax as a recovery of basis. Thus, actual basis would become
meaningless because basis would effectively be whatever is in the investment
account—a constructive basis concept in income tax lexicon.
The tradeoff for this simplification in record keeping and computation under
either consumption tax system is in the transition. Under the cash flow system,
there is a need to keep track of the wealth the taxpayer had at the commencement of the system. Under a yield exemption system, there is a need to keep
track of previously earned income at the corporate level that at least arguably
should not give rise to exempted dividends, and appreciation inherent in property at the date of commencement of the new system, which presumably should
not escape tax.
Under a system that employs a combination of cash flow and yield exemption
provisions by means of allowing a deduction for some designated investments
and yield exemption for others, there is a need to keep track of which assets are
under which regime. It seems likely that this task is easier than keeping basis
records, but it does not rise to the level of the simplicity promised by either of
the pure systems.
3. The Treatment of the Business Taxpayer Separately from the Individual
Under a pure yield exemption system at the individual level, corporate income
and partnership income would be exempt from tax. Neither exemption has been
proposed to date. Rather, all preferential tax treatment is accorded only portfolio-type investment income, as it is defined in section 163, and at the investor
level.
However, a true consumption tax would not be in force unless some form of it
was instituted at the business level as well. Under a cash flow system, that could
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be accomplished by allowing all business expenses to be deducted and eliminating the income tax concept of capitalization. This choice has been the one
employed in recently enacted business tax incentives discussed earlier.147 Alternatively, it could be accomplished as a yield exemption system by not taxing
income attributable to capital, but also not allowing a deduction for capital
expenditures. Isolating from labor income that income derived from capital,
however, is at best problematic and probably makes such a system unfeasible.148
Finally, a business level consumption tax could be accomplished by imposing
a tax on business under a point of sale system like the retail sales tax or VAT
described earlier in this article. Indeed, most consumption tax reforms that have
been proposed deal separately with investors and business taxpayers and create
two independent tax regimes.149
Reform at the business level can be accomplished independently of reform at
the individual investor level, as discussed earlier. Michael Graetz has recently
proposed a hybrid reform tax system that encompasses two separate taxes.150 An
income tax would be retained for those taxpayers earning in excess of $75,000
or $100,000. The tax rate would range between 10 and 15% of that amount.
Taxpayers earning less than that would be completely exempt from the income
tax. In addition, a value added tax, a consumption tax collected at point of sale,
would be imposed at the rate of 10-15%, although other forms of consumption
tax could be used as well. Graetz would also retain the corporate tax at a
somewhat lower rate than the current rate and would retain some sort of a state
tax as well, also at a lower rate than the currently prevailing one.151
The essence of Graetz’s proposal, however, could be viewed as a combination
of the separate income and consumption taxes, each accomplishing its own
particular goal. By separating the taxes, the consumption element could be free
from the burden of progressivity relative to income. That function would be in
the exclusive domain of the income tax, which would contain a zero rate bracket
extending up to $100,000 of income. The consumption tax component, then,
could be chosen solely for purposes of achieving efficiency in terms of both
collection and impact on the market for goods and services. A credit method
value added tax collected at point of sale, in my view, would be the method of
choice.152 Under the hybrid system encompassing the two distinct types of taxes,
the tax expenditure analysis would be quite appropriate in evaluating special
provisions of the income tax. Similarly, a tax expenditure analysis could also be
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employed for the value added tax, in the event Congress could not withstand the
impulse to exclude certain goods or services from coverage under the tax. Importantly, adoption of such a system requires acceptance of the wisdom of a
hybrid system and the desire to achieve it in the most efficient way.
Graetz, however, has never adequately explained how the income tax rates
could be kept at a level less than confiscatory when only a small fraction of the
population would be subject to it. The pressure to reduce the VAT rate, funded
by an increase in the income tax rate, would seem to be difficult for a popularly
elected Congress to resist.
Perhaps more important, however, is that the overall consumption tax train for
individuals seems to be leaving the station. The current administration’s new
yield exemption proposal, coupled with those consumption tax features that are
currently in the tax law (and are not to be replaced), may have left the Graetz
hybrid proposal in its wake, notwithstanding the merits it may have.
VI. CONCLUSION
Americans tend to keep much of their wealth invested in qualified retirement
plans and their homes. These are both treated under consumption tax regimes.
Wealth maintained outside of those forms, if invested in appreciating portfolio
assets like stock, which in general tend to pay modest, if any, dividends, enjoys
the consumption tax features of appreciation without realization, nonrecognition
on several types of exchanges, and stepped-up basis at death. Moreover, capital
gains when realized and dividends are taxed at a lower rate than other income, in
effect, according partial yield exemption. Further, a taxpayer can save for the
education of his children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, or even unborn great
grandchildren, under the yield exemption consumption tax section 529 plans.
And, if recent proposals for complete yield exemption dividend treatment and
special savings accounts are enacted, even savings that generate current yields in
the form of dividends and interest will enjoy consumption tax treatment. Finally,
business taxpayer provisions that replace strict capitalization and deductions for
economic depreciation with immediate write-off or fast depreciation, as under
sections 179 and 168 (in particular 168(k)), approach consumption tax treatment
as well. If the Bush Treasury’s proposal is adopted in the future, the evolution of
the U.S. income tax to the U.S. consumption tax will be virtually complete. But
even if the proposal is not adopted or only adopted in part, the U.S. tax system
would still best be described as a hybrid, with noticeable movement with each
set of income tax code amendments to a consumption tax.
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